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ABSTRACT 
 
In contemporary world affairs, it is seemingly impossible to separate religion 
from politics. Turkey and Israel are often pointed to as states that still struggle with 
balancing religious and secular forces. Both Turkey and Israel’s independence era leaders 
desired secular, modern republics, looking to French laicism as a method to subordinate 
religion from the state, but unlike France, neither was able to accomplish this goal. How 
did this come to be? I argue that the compromises of Turkish and Israeli independence-
era secular leaders with religious advocacy coalitions which established Religious 
Ministries as a quick policy solution inadvertently paved the way for religion to exert a 
central influence.  Through such ministries, religious groups were able to enshrine 
particular strains of Islam and Judaism along with their particular conceptions of 
citizenship based on ethno-religious grounds in place of initial republican ideals. This 
pull between rival definitions of citizenship—secular and religious—would go on to 
define debates for decades. Using the complementary lenses of historical and discursive 
institutionalism I will trace the processes by which particular conceptualizations of 
citizenship were reached by advocacy coalitions of secular and conservative forces, how 
these philosophies became the basis for institutions, and how those institutions went on to 
constrain future interpretations.  
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Introduction 
In contemporary world affairs, it is seemingly impossible to separate religion 
from politics. Turkey and Israel are often pointed to as states that still struggle with 
balancing religious and secular forces. Both Turkey and Israel’s independence era leaders 
desired secular, modern republics, looking to French laicism as a method to subordinate 
religion from the state, but unlike France, neither was able to accomplish this goal. How 
did this come to be? I argue that the compromises of Turkish and Israeli independence-
era secular leaders with religious advocacy coalitions which established Religious 
Ministries as a quick policy solution inadvertently paved the way for religion to exert a 
central influence.  Through such ministries, religious groups were able to enshrine 
particular strains of Islam and Judaism along with their particular conceptions of 
citizenship based on ethno-religious grounds in place of initial republican ideals. This 
pull between rival definitions of citizenship—secular and religious—would go on to 
define debates for decades. Using the complementary lenses of historical and discursive 
institutionalism I will trace the processes by which particular conceptualizations of 
citizenship were reached by advocacy coalitions of secular and conservative forces, how 
these philosophies became the basis for institutions, and how those institutions went on to 
constrain future interpretations.  
During the establishment of the Republic of Turkey and the State of Israel, the 
definition of citizenship played a central role in determining institutions, programs, and 
policies. Turkey and Israel faced similar battles between secularism and religious 
conservatism, and negotiated new conceptualizations of citizenship and nationalism 
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amidst these battles. Leaders were additionally met with the unique opportunity to create 
entirely new collective memories and national identities that would be determined by 
their definitions of citizenship. A multitude of groups sought to influence the parameters 
of citizenry to favor their own conceptualizations of societal membership. Amidst these 
pressures, the central goal of secular leaders was to develop a modern-nation state. 
Leaders of Turkey and Israel, particularly Mustafa Kemal and David Ben-Gurion, desired 
secular states where individual rights were balanced with religious ones. Religion was 
bound to be an important component of Turkish and Israeli nationalism as both countries 
were established as iterations of ancient cultures united by religion. Religion was 
entrenched in society, and would need to be addressed by early governments. 
An important set of distinctions to remember when considering the relationship 
between government and religion in Turkey and Israel are those between the ideologies 
of laicism and secularism. Both originated in the Enlightenment period, and have 
continued to evolve. Any ideology’s strength lies in its malleability, and 21st century 
nation states often adopt a form of one or the other. In the Anglo-inspired secularism, the 
state seeks to completely remove religion from the public sphere. French laicism 
advocates the temperament of the influence of religion within government by ensuring 
against any religious involvement in government.  
In the French case, laicism prevailed because the definition of French citizenship 
was successfully separated from any religious distinctions, and belonging to a religious 
group became distinct from being a French citizen. The French government successfully 
promoted a sense of nationalism while providing programmatic and policy solutions such 
 	3 
as “free, compulsory and laic education in France.”1 Other state initiatives and laws 
encouraged patriotic sentiments and replaced religious symbols and traditions that 
previously enabled clerical control. French nationalism did not rely on religious ideas, 
symbols or actors. Being a Frenchmen did not require being a member of a particular 
religion. This is extremely different from the tones struck by early Turkish and Israeli 
policies. Secular leaders hands’ were forced, and religious advocacy groups demanded 
and obtained inclusion in early governments.  
Laicism featured prominently in Kemalism. In fact, Kose states that, “If there is 
one image associated with the Turkish Revolution and with the Kemalist ideology on 
which it was based, it is that of laicism or ‘secular’ reform”. 2 In Turkey, laïcité became 
laiklik. This allowed the new state to curate a secular image in the international system, 
but in reality, religion played a significant role in state formation. 3 While Kemal strictly 
delineated the line between religion and state, this does not mean religion and 
government were never to intersect. On the contrary, Kemal intended complete control of 
religion by the state. 4 Israel’s Ben-Gurion felt that the country’s viability as a modern 
nation state rested on its ability to maintain secular, liberal values and the freedom of 
religion. Yet he also had to contend with powerful religious forces present during the 																																																								
1 Power, ‘The French Laic Laws (1879–1889): The First Anti-Clerical Campaign of the 
Third French Republic”, Review of Politics, 4:3 (1942). 357. 
2 Brockett, “Revisiting the Turkish Revolution, 1923–1938: Secular Reform and 
Religious Reaction, Gavin. “Revisiting the Turkish Revolution, 1923–1938: History 
Compass 4:6 (2006): 1060. 
3 Warhola, James, Bezci, E. “Religion and State in Contemporary Turkey: Recent 
Developments in Laiklik.” Journal of Church and State 52:3 (2010): 428 
4 Warhola, “Religion and State in Contemporary Turkey: Recent Developments in 
Laiklik.”428. 
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Yishuv period and at Israel’s founding. Both men sought control of early governments 
and realized pragmatism would be necessary.  
In an idiosyncratic and politically expedient move, leaders gave a seemingly 
unimportant ministry to religious ideological groups. To gain political flexibility 
elsewhere, Kemal and Ben-Gurion followed the adage “keep your friends close, your 
enemies closer” and incorporated religion into government institutions: the Turkish 
Presidency of Religious Affairs5 and the Israeli Ministry of Religious Services.6 
Ironically, the move meant to placate and sideline religious groups ultimately enshrined 
their beliefs, entrenched their practices and delegated defining citizenship to these 
Ministries. In both Turkey and Israel, religious ministries were established in specific 
veins of Islam and Judaism, setting the stage for decades of contention. The religious 
interpretations of Ministries countered democratic goals and alienated significant portions 
of populations and empowered the very religious groups secular leaders attempted to 
quiet. 
 By tracing the inception, codification, and evolution of these Ministries using the 
lenses of historical and discursive institutionalism I will highlight the omnipresence and 
importance of ideas and their institutionalization. The institutions created at the founding 
of Turkey and Israel propagated specific philosophical ideas of what it meant to be a 																																																								
5 There are several names for the Religious Ministry that was established under this 
Constitution: The General Directorate of Religious Affairs, Department of the Affairs of 
Piety, Directorate-General of Religious Affairs, and Religious Affairs Directorate. Most 
English sources refer to the Ministry as the Presidency of Religious Affairs, or the PRA. 
6 Over the years, the Israeli Ministry that handled underwent many name changes; when 
discussing the general lifespan of the Ministry I will call it the Ministry of Religious 
Services. 
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Turk or an Israeli. Attempted changes to the Ministries highlight the entrenchment of 
religious forces and institutional constraints formed by early compromises. Discursive 
debates underlie both early coalitions and later tussles for influence, and the institutions 
themselves played an integral role in setting the boundaries of debate. Turkey and Israel 
provide two exceptional cases where secularist and religious forces battled for dominance 
at the time of independence and continue to do so today. 
Comparisons between Turkey and Israel are many, since they share a few 
important similarities but also a plethora of differences. With different economic 
development, urbanization levels, party systems (and relative strengths), electoral 
structures, majority religions and general history in relation to the region and the world, 
they allow isolation of variables, and a true consideration of institutional change and 
discursive evolution. Additionally, Turkey and Israel are an attractive comparison 
because they debunk essentialist and Orientalist theorizations that are all too common in 
considerations of the relationship between state and religion in the Middle East. 
Understanding the formal and informal association of religion and governance in Turkey 
and Israel is paramount to any consideration of either country, as well as to the region as 
a whole. To understand the relationship between religion and government, it is necessary 
to go one step further, and investigate the source of this debate. To do so, we must begin 
with the tools provided by historical and discursive institutionalism. Following a 
discussion of the theoretical foundations of the thesis, I will separate my case studies into 
three sections: Ideational Foundations, Institutions Produced, and Evolutions. In 
Ideational Foundations, I will investigate the various types of discourse that influenced 
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the founding of Turkey and Israel, paying special attention to the conservative and 
secularist forces at work. In Institutions Produced, I will trace how those ideas were 
codified in the Ministries of Religion and enabled religious forces. Last, in Evolutions I 
will highlight one attempted change and one successful alteration to the Ministries, 
therefore underlining what forces are necessary to incite institutional change. Through 
this process, it will be clear how independence era compromises entrenched specific 
values through the Ministries of Religion and prevented laicism from taking root in 
Turkish and Israeli society.  
 
 	7 
Theoretical Foundations 
 
  Ideas are fundamental to society and its government. Ideas motivate, inspire, and 
influence the foundations of governance. Institutions are the interactive context in which 
ideas are introduced, discussed, argued, contested, propelled, and enacted. Historical 
institutionalism provides explanations of the mechanisms of change within institutions, 
while discursive institutionalism sheds light on how and why these changes come about. 
These two analytical lenses provide a myriad of tools that aid in the process tracing of 
citizenship discourse in Turkey and Israel. For this endeavor, the most useful components 
of historical institutionalism and discursive institutionalism describe the interactions that 
occurred within institutions among actors and coalitions. From historical institutionalism, 
I draw on the explanatory abilities of power sharing coalitions, the emphasis on 
interactions within institutions and their actors, and the theory’s modal types of 
institutional change. Discursive institutionalism provides the lens to examine ideas; its 
classification of levels of ideas, description of interactions of sentient actors and 
advocacy coalitions, and illumination of argumentation methods lend the capacity to 
identify specific ideas and their entrenchment.   
Historical institutionalism’s focus on the constraints imposed by institutions and 
the power to influence actors is key in understanding the implications of the 
establishment of the Religious Ministries. Historical institutionalism considers policy 
outcomes as the product of interaction among various groups, interests, ideas and 
institutional structures. The state is not a static institution, and should instead be viewed 
in terms of “stateness”, where there are “sets of institutions, power sharing agreements 
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and a complex web of relationships.” 7 Interaction between institutions and the actors 
within them is very important to understanding the constraints actors face and the 
pressures institutions endure. In their work Structuring Politics, Thelen and Steinmo cite 
Peter Hall, who explained that institutions shape goals of political actors and their power 
relations. He states that: “Institutional factors play two fundamental roles in this model. 
On the one hand, the organization of policy-making affects the degree of power that any 
one set of actors has over the policy outcomes…On the other hand, organizational 
position also influences an actor’s definition of his own interests…”8 Actors are not only 
rational individuals operating in a vacuum, they are constrained and propelled by 
structural forces within the institution. Thelen states, “By shaping not just actors’ 
strategies (as in rational choice) but their goals as well, and by mediating their relations 
of cooperation and conflict, institutions structure political situations and leave their own 
imprint on political outcomes.”9 Interactions determine the structure of institutions, but 
are constrained by institutions themselves. Institutions affect actors, and actors in turn 
affect institutions. For institutions to change, there must be a significant move for it to 
evolve.  
 Once institutions are created, some argue they are path dependent, and determined 
to perform the same functions until a critical juncture causes the proverbial river to jump 
																																																								
7 Tepe, Beyond Sacred and Secular: Politics of Religion in Israel and Turkey, 65. 
8 Mahoney, James, Thelen, K. Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency and 
Power. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2010, 3. 
9 Mahoney, Thelen, Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency and Power, 9. 
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its bank. Thelen and her many co-authors10 discredit the simplicity of path dependency 
and critical juncture theories. She writes, “…it is not sufficient to view institutions as 
frozen residue of critical junctures, or even as ‘locked in’ in the straightforward sense that 
path dependence arguments adapted from the economics literature often suggest.”11 
Institutions are a part of “ongoing political contestation”, and the aforementioned 
political coalitions that they are established within drive their internal structure and 
external functions. 12 Path determination theories are too rigid to explain the fluid and 
fluctuating changes institutions undergo. What is instead at work is a more nuanced, fluid 
process that encompasses countless interactions, debates and compromise. As such, 
institutions are “the product of past and ongoing political intervention and tinkering, of 
active maintenance and re-setting.” 13 Once again, interactions between political actors 
and their coalitions drive change within institutions. 
Historical institutionalism also provides an explanation of how institutions change 
when they do. Thelen and Mahoney outline four modal types of institutional change: 
displacement (removal of existing rules and introduction of new ones), layering 
(introduction of new rules on top of or alongside existing ones, changing how the rules 
structure behavior), drift (changed impact of existing rules due to shifts in the 
environment) and conversion (changed enactment of existing rules due to their strategic 																																																								
10 Works by Steinmo, Skocpol and Mahoney, among others were influential in the 
writing of this theoretical section. 
11 Thelen, How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, 
the United States, and Japan, 8. 
12 Thelen, How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, 
the United States, and Japan, 31.  
13 Thelen, How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, 
the United States, and Japan, 3–4. 
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redeployment).14 Layering is especially important in identifying internal structural 
changes of the Religious Ministries. Overall, historical institutionalism enables us to 
identify the impact of institutional constraints on actors, the importance of actors and 
coalitions and the necessary components to precede change. What it misses, however, is 
what is at the basis of these institutions and coalitions, and the motivations that alter 
actors’ courses of action. This is where I turn to discursive institutionalism. Together, the 
two are complementary, enabling me to explain the dynamism of institutional change 
through the discursive interactions of the principal actors. 
Discursive institutionalism focuses on the power of ideas and the importance of 
discourse in solidifying communities, and producing coalitions and institutions. 
Discursive institutionalism is a set of ways to explain political and social reality, focused 
on the substantive content of ideas and the interactive processes of discourse in 
institutional context. It divides ideas into normative or cognitive. Normative ideas 
indicate, “what is good and what is bad”, while cognitive ideas work to justify policy 
options.15 Once a normative idea is chosen, cognitive ideas influence debate on how 
normative ideas should be communicated. Discursive institutionalism then dissects ideas 
into three levels of generality- philosophical, programmatic and policies. Philosophical 
ideas within the political sphere are tied to broader moral and normative values. In the 
cases of Turkey and Israel, this level of generality is of the upmost importance, as it is 
where discussions of citizenship occur. At the programmatic level, philosophical changes 																																																								
14 Thelen, How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, 
the United States, and Japan, 16. 
15 Ibid. 309. 
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are implemented via paradigm shifts. In the cases of Turkey and Israel, programs like 
language instruction and religious instruction doctrine convey broader conceptualizations 
of citizenship. Last, policies are the most fluid implementation of ideas as they change 
rapidly. When identifying institutional change, successive policy changes can signal a 
deeper change in programs and philosophies. 
Actors then communicate ideas (at all levels). Sentient actors “construct, 
articulate, communicate, argue and contest” ideas and are incredibly important in the 
translation of an idea from abstract philosophy to a tangible policy.16 Art elaborates, 
“Deliberation matters. Elites in democracies react to, challenge, modify, and adopt the 
ideas of others as they debate one another... Through this process, elites create frames, 
the weight of elite opinion shifts, and new discourses emerge.”17 In communicating these 
ideas, actors engage in coordinative and communicative discourse. Coordinative 
discourse among policy actors is relayed to the public through communicative discourse, 
and ideas continue to evolve, influence and incite change.18 During the course of these 
discussions, actors form advocacy coalitions. Advocacy coalitions are made up of not 
only actors that share ideational values and philosophical goals, but include actors that 
can influence real political change via institutions and social mobilization. These 
coalitions explain the aforementioned political coalitions, such as those created by 
influential religious groups. Through advocacy coalitions, these ideological groups 
gained enough clout to influence Kemal and Ben-Gurion. Ideas existing at every level of 																																																								
16 Schmidt, “Discursive Institutionalism”, 87.  
17 Art, David, The Politics of the Nazi Past in Germany and Austria, 41. 
18 Schmidt, “Discursive Institutionalism”, 87 
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generality are debated in coordinative and communicative discourse. Epistemic 
communities may form within the public sphere, and are united by those with similar 
ideas. In Turkey and Israel, minority populations formed cohesive epistemic communities 
that could not engage in effective coordinative discourse of policy because they had little 
access to policymakers.  Argumentation of ideas can include “narratives, frames, frames 
of reference, discursive fields of ideas, argumentative practices, storytelling, and 
collective memories.”19  Discursive communities used many of these different ways of 
conveying their ideas in both the cases of Turkey and Israel. 
To highlight the usefulness of discursive institutionalism, I will consider two 
extremely important philosophical ideas that determined the course of Turkey and Israel- 
citizenship and nationalism. Nationalism is often heralded as a prevailing unifying factor 
for nascent states, but in the cases of Turkey and Israel, it is necessary to search one step 
deeper and consider the citizenship discourses that occurred at the time of independence. 
At the heart of every nation is the relationship between state and individual. Definitions 
of citizenship determine the parameters of social contracts and carry significant 
implications for the future of states. Citizenship discourse is an example of a 
philosophical idea with real repercussions in the policy and public spheres.  
Most states choose one lens of citizenship discourse to establish a barrage of 
characteristics that make a “citizen.” Shafir outlines the three philosophies of citizenship 
as liberal, republican, or ethno-national. Each vein determines what defines citizenship 
and associates a different package of rights with citizenship. The liberal conception 																																																								
19 Schmidt, Discursive Institutionalism, 85. 
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places personal liberty at the forefront, and individuals are expected to bear universal 
rights, and are not “beholden to the community.” In this civic nation, citizens are “equal 
and rights bearing.”20 Republicanism on the other hand, is based on civil duty and creates 
a self-limiting realm that institutionalizes methods of compromise and emphasizes moral 
laws. Ethno-national citizenship highlights the importance of membership in a 
community realized in a national or ethnic group.21 Adhering to their French models, 
secular leaders of Turkey and Israel advocated republican theories of citizenship. Kemal 
included republicanism in his six pillars of Kemalism, while Ben-Gurion supported 
considering all those who believed themselves to be Jews to be Israelis, as long as they 
were supportive of the success of the state of Israel. With the pressures presented by the 
religious forces, however, each nation eventually incorporated ethno-national 
conceptualizations of citizenship. This happened through coordinative debates and 
discourse between the two groups. As independence movements forged on, coalitions 
communicated their philosophical, programmatic and policy goals and eventually 
compromised upon this definition of citizenship. In the cases of Turkey and Israel, two 
philosophies were blended to create national citizenship that still lacked precise 
definition. Later programmatic and policy implementations of this idea would carry 
important implications. 
A secondary aspect of citizenship discourse is the state’s philosophical 																																																								
20 Aktoprak, Elcin. “Citizenship and National Identity: A Comparative Analysis.” In 
Societal Peace and Ideal Citizenship for Turkey, edited by Rasim Ozgur Donmez and 
Pinar Enneli, 27–48. New York: Lexington Books, 2011, 27. 
21 This movement originated in Eastern Europe and Germany, where many Jewish 
immigrants originated. 
 	14 
interpretation of nationalism. Gellner states that, “Nationalism is not the awakening of 
nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exists.”22 Many have 
asserted that Israel is exactly this type of nation, and that it employed a multitude of 
argumentative tactics to ensure that its created philosophy of nationalism was sustainable 
and durable. Turkey is arguably a nation that existed prior to its establishment, but its 
national consciousness is certainly a recent phenomenon since its modern “principles” 
were established at the War of Independence.  
Nationalism possesses the power to influence entire communities and regions. 
Benedict Anderson is well known for his postulation that nations are “imagined political 
communities”, and that they are both “inherently limited and sovereign.” 23 Nations are 
limited as they can only incorporate particular territories, groups and ideals, and are 
sovereign over these things. Israeli nationalism is a prime example of Anderson’s 
imagined communities, as Jews have remained connected for centuries in while in 
diaspora. In a community with limited face-to-face contact the motivation to create an 
actual state required a common unifier of nationalism.24 This common idea culminates in 
collective identities and memories that build on blocs of nationalism like symbolism, 
religion and language (argumentative practices of discursive institutionalism).  
Symbols and cultural artifacts are a powerful tool in the crafting of a new feeling 
of nationalism, granting a new state legitimacy. Anderson places symbolism in a larger 																																																								
22 Aktoprak, “Citizenship and National Identity: A Comparative Analysis,” 6. 
23 Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism. London: Verso, 1982, 5. 
24 Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism. London: Verso, 1982, 5.  
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system of cultural artifacts. Artifacts command a cultural legitimacy, gained from a 
collective acceptance of a particular interpretation. Interpretation, appropriation and 
acceptance of symbols are key steps in crafting collective memories and identities. 
Symbols fit into a larger cultural paradigm that can be utilized to create a cohesive 
collective memory and identity. 
Religious symbols are especially potent, but simultaneously constrained by 
interpretation. For example, Israel appropriated images of controlling the location of the 
Second Temple, but such a symbol empowered religious groups rather than modernists. 
Religion is a “symbolic” system in and of itself, it can “convey multiple meanings and 
inform diverse positions.” 25 Tepe, underlines the power of religious symbols to create 
such nationalistic devotion, but reminds of their limits; “their interpretations are bounded 
by certain rules, shared knowledge, and acknowledged practices.” 26 Any symbol is 
reliant on an agreed definition and narrative and can be altered to further nationalistic 
purposes. Israel actively employed and continues to employ religious symbolism in its 
justification of statehood. Biblical references are plentiful in Israeli culture, seen 
everywhere from shekel coinage to math textbooks that convert modern monetary 
systems to ancient currencies.27 Kemal successfully molded some religious symbols to 
the benefit of Turkish nationalism, but early Turkish leadership ignored the power of 
religious symbols, leaving much of the population outside of the discursive process of 
legitimizing the new state. By using pre-Ottoman era symbols but Islam as a key factor of 																																																								
25 Tepe, Beyond Sacred and Secular: Politics of Religion in Israel and Turkey, 51. 
26 Tepe, Beyond Sacred and Secular: Politics of Religion in Israel and Turkey, 52. 
27 Tepe, Beyond Sacred and Secular: Politics of Religion in Israel and Turkey, 52. 
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defining Turkishness the new regime was not as effective as it could have been. The 
ability to tie a modern nation state to ancient greatness is a persuasive tool in creating 
national cohesion and a national identity. Symbols are an effective argumentative practice 
used to convey a larger citizenship discourse. 
Another major component of nationalistic discourse is actual language. Turkey 
and Israel each engaged in unique initiatives to transform the language of their newly 
independent states. With the latinization of the alphabet in 1928, Kemal clearly moved 
Turkey from its historical association with the Arab world to the modern European 
dominated international system. The linguistic transformation also successfully severed 
ties to an Ottoman past centered on religion. In contrast, Israel brought back a traditional 
language rarely spoken to unite its disparate citizens to add one more reminder of their 
“ancient” existence. By making Hebrew the national language of Israel, the Yishuv28 
government’s and Zionist Congresses required all immigrants to learn a new language, 
and assume a new identity as not just Jewish, but Israeli. Anderson explains these moves 
were powerful because they solidified national definitions of membership. When religion 
dominated ideological allegiances, language was the foundation of imagined 
communities; it established a “confidence in the unique sacredness…and thus their ideas 
about admission to membership.” 29 Communication is key in any state, especially one 
creating a new history and identity. 
Discursive institutionalism’s ability to categorize types of ideas is useful in 																																																								
28 The Jewish Community in Pre-statehood Palestine. 
29 Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism, 13. 
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explaining the failure of laicism in Turkey and Israel. Both countries adopted particular 
blends of citizenship discourse as a result of coordinative discourses between ideational 
leaders (Kemal and Ben-Gurion) and advocacy coalitions (conservative religious actors). 
Their programmatic, policy solution of providing religious forces with a ministry sought 
to limit their influence in government, but instead it entrenched specific religious 
definitions of citizenship and ultimately constrained future attempts to alter the system. 
Both historical and discursive institutionalism are necessary to connect independence eras 
attempts towards laicism and republican basis of citizenship to the present day challenges 
each country faces in the balance of religion and government. Only through identifying 
discursive struggles and advocacy coalitions (and the institutions they produced) can we 
see the institutions that let religious elites have the power to decide what ideas became 
embedded in institutions, government, and society.  
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[I] Ideational Forces  
 Turkey and Israel have complex histories that have both striking similarities and 
differences. From their Ottoman past to Western interventions, both were met with a 
unique opportunity at independence: battle hardened citizens and leaders, poised to 
emerge from the ashes, ready to enter the Western world, all while harking to their 
ancient pasts. Kemal and Ben-Gurion were military men with secular beliefs who 
envisioned countries that would rewrite the rules of secular modernity. Both looked to 
French laïcité as a method of acknowledging strong religious forces in their country 
while balancing the need for liberal, individual rights. Turkey’s Tanzimat reforms30 and 
Young Turk revolutions meant various ideological forces were already gathering support 
in society. Conservative advocacy coalitions called for a pious return to Sunni traditions, 
while Kemalists pushed for a secular republic. Kemal’s victory against the West in the 
War of Liberation31 increased his currency in discursive debates. Israel, on the other 
hand, remained very divided, with sharper schisms between Orthodox and Secular 
Zionists, Ashkenazis from Europe and Sephardim from the Middle East. The Israeli War 
of Independence masked these differences as Jews fought for a permanent home in 																																																								
30 The Tanzimat reforms included the first Ottoman Constitution (Kanvn I Esasi), 
military reforms, administrative service creation and social reforms that sought to 
integrate Muslims and non-Muslims through enhanced civil liberties. 
31 A Young Turk General, Mustafa Kemal, led Turkish troops in the Western part of the 
country. His repellence of the British land invasion in the Battle of Gallipoli quickly 
catapulted him to military and political fame. After World War One, from 1919–1920, 
the Turkish fought a War of Liberation against Greece, the United Kingdom and France 
under Kemal and other CUP leadership. During this time, Kemal became the leader of the 
Grand National Assembly and the Commander in Chief, and the de facto leader of the 
Turks. The 1920 Treaty of Lausanne led to an end to the war, and Turkey finally became 
an independent modern nation state. 
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Palestine.32 Alliances were struck during the war that carried implications for future 
government power sharing agreements. Institutionally, the two stood on very different 
footing, but both were clarifying new cognitive norms, developing philosophies of 
citizenship and renegotiating national narratives and collective memories.  
In Beyond Sacred and Secular, Tepe argues that the leaders of both nations shared 
basic backgrounds that held implications for the future of both countries; “The 
constitutive elite of the two nation-states shared intellectual ties during their formative 
years…(they) were educated in Ottoman schools, were active in the Ottoman parliament, 
and were exposed to the ideas that shaped the empire’s unique political system- most 
important its millet system, which consisted of autonomous religious communities and 
sought to prevent the empire’s disintegration along sectarian lines.”33 At the peak of its 
power, the Ottoman Empire sprawled across the Middle East, encompassing countless 
ethnic and religious groups. Its millet system allowed non-Muslim minorities to largely 
govern themselves.34 The Ottoman Sultan’s hands-off approach with minorities created a 
tradition of self-government in minority communities, and facilitated various power 
sharing arrangements. 
Not only did leaders experience the autonomous institutions of the Ottoman 
Empire, they also saw first hand the failures and successes of attempted reforms. The 																																																								
32 After World War Two, and the United Nations Partition Plan that divided Palestine 
into a Jewish and an Arab state, a full-fledge civil war erupted. The battle engulfed 
surrounding Arab nations, who came to arms in support of the Palestinians. Eventually, 
on May 14, 1948, the Israeli state declared independence, altering the region forever. 
33 Tepe, Beyond Sacred and Secular: Politics of Religion in Israel and Turkey, 16. 
34 Aral, Berdal. “The Idea of Human Rights as Perceived in the Ottoman Empire.” 
Human Rights Quarterly 26 (2004): 474. 
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Ottoman Tanzimat period influenced both Turkey and Israel. In Turkey, the stage was set 
for debate between Young Turk secularists, conservative Islamists and other Ottomanists. 
After WWI, Palestine’s experience as a British mandate saw lingering Ottoman 
institutions and intensifying debates between the Yishuv communities. While 
institutionally different, Israel and Turkey saw similar discursive debates surrounding 
new definitions of citizenship, nationalism and the future of the state that were 
remarkably similar. The omnipresence of religion was felt by all, and a key component of 
defining the new states that hoped to incorporate laïcité, democracy and republican 
ideals.  
 
Turkish Ideas: Legacies of Tanzimat and Divisions of Independence 
For centuries, the Ottoman Empire held the Islamic caliphate, and thus acted as 
the center of Muslim political power. The role of Islam in Ottoman politics and 
government is undeniable.  Key actors and groups at Turkish independence have roots in 
previous movements during the Tanzimat and the First and Second Constitutional eras. 
With the “clean slate” of independence, disagreeing elite actors and groups advocated 
very different philosophies of citizenship and nationalism.  
The overarching ideological “Turkish revolution” began with the Young Turk 
Revolution of 1903 and continued under the Kemalist revolution of 1919–23. This 
incremental revolution altered the entire fabric of society. It aimed to complete Tanzimat 
goals and Westernize all components of the empire, from political to social to economic 
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to cultural norms. 35 The elites of the period subscribed to the belief that in order to 
modernize, the empire must centralize and secularize. 36 After independence, the 
remnants of the Islamic Ottoman Empire were to be transformed into secular, 
constitutional institutions. To accomplish this, Kemal and his contemporaries had to 
discredit other ideas pushing for inclusion. To successfully undertake such an effort, the 
citizens of this new country needed to be convinced of its merits and drawn away from 
other ideas and discursive communities. 
During the revolutionary era, discourse swirled in an eddy of revolutionary fervor. 
Preeminent concepts included Ottomanism, Islamism, Pan-Turkism, and Kemalism, and 
religious and social tensions were high. Ottomanism sought to create a national sense of 
“imperial citizenship or transnational Ottoman identity.”37 Early Ottomanism existed 
among elites who aimed to maintain their preeminent positions of influence in society 
amidst reforms. 38 Tanzimat reforms coincided with urbanization and shifts between 
ethnic and social divisions.39 Elites worked to capitalize on a variety of identities so that 
could navigate “multiplicities of social spaces without dissolving their private/communal 
features.” 40  Identity was a very fluid concept, and remained self-descriptive. Ottomanists 
did not accept the need to abolish Ottoman institutions and instead advocated institutional 																																																								
35 Kazamias, Andreas M. Education and the quest for modernity in Turkey. London: 
Allen & Unwin. (1966), 17. 
36 Sunar, Ilkay. State, Society and Democracy in Turkey. Istanbul: Bahcesehi University. 
2004, 158. 
37 Tepe, Beyond Sacred and Secular: Politics of Religion in Israel and Turkey. 
38 Donmez, Rasim Ozgur. “Beyond State-Led Nationalism: Ideal Citizenship for 
Turkey.” In Societal Peace and Ideal Citizenship for Turkey, edited by Rasim Ozgur 
Donmez and Pinar Enneli, 1–26. New York: Lexington Books, 2011, 4. 
39 Donmez, “Beyond State-Led Nationalism: Ideal Citizenship for Turkey,” 4. 
40 Donmez, “Beyond State-Led Nationalism: Ideal Citizenship for Turkey,” 4. 
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layering. To them, institutions like Seriyye and Evkaf41 were too sacred to completely 
abolish, and conversion would preserve their character.  
Conservative religious groups emphasized Pan-Islamism; they “attributed the 
weaknesses of the Ottoman Empire to the abandonment of orthodox Islamic principles 
and institutions.”42 These advocacy groups petitioned for the retention of the mujallah 
legal system, Islamic schools and an overall religious government, even more religious 
than the Ottoman sultanate.43 Overall, they promoted a religious society and a return to 
religiously motivated laws and governance. Pan-Turks, on the other hand, advocated a 
Turkish citizenship based on ethnic similarities, and campaigned for a narrower definition 
of Turkishness with few allowances for minorities. While these groups had significant 
portions of the population behind them, none had the charisma or discursive influence of 
Kemal and his Kemalism based on both ethno-national and republican parameters. 
Mustafa Kemal worked to ethnify Islam in Turkey, and unify Turks by their 
“Turkishness” rather than their religion or Ottoman era ethnic divides. Kemalism and the 
Young Turks envisioned Turkishness as a linguistically based identity that would 
incorporate many ethnicities and cultures previously separated by the millet system. 
Reflecting their conceptualization of Turkey as a “conglomeration of religious and ethic 
groups without political bonds”, the first leaders of Turkey did their upmost to desacrilize 																																																								
41 The Evkaf in Turkey was the board of Pious Foundations, which handled religious 
donations while the Seriyye was an early Ministry of Religious Affairs that coordinated 
between the state and local religious matters. 
42 Donmez, “Beyond State-Led Nationalism: Ideal Citizenship for Turkey.” 107. 
43 Afsah, Ebrahim. “Constitution-Making in Islamic Countries- A Theoretical 
Framework.” In Constitution-Making in Islamic Countries: Between Upheaval and 
Continuity, edited by Rainer Grote and Tilamnn Roder. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010. 
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politics and establish a new national identity.44  First and foremost, they separated 
themselves from the “duality” of state and faith and moved quickly to legitimize their 
new state under a collective memory of “Turkishness” rather than Islamic Ottoman 
identities. 45 Kemal possessed great influence in both the policy and public spheres, but 
not enough to counter centuries of Islamic practice in law and strong Islamic forces 
during independence. His laiklik stemmed from the realization that Islam simply could 
not be eradicated from the public sphere. Instead, Kemal simply began to advocate for 
government monopolization of religion. 46 Ironically, at the end of the day, the new 
“Turkishness” was based on the unifying trait of Islam.  As expected, this carried 
implications for the adoption of a citizenship reliant on ethno-national characteristics, 
alongside republican ideals. 
In the new Republic of Turkey, the relationship between state and religion was 
immediately complex, since Kemal simultaneously used Islam to assimilate Muslim 
minorities as “Turkish” while pushing Islam from daily life and government activities. 
Kemal’s nation would redefine Islam and its role in national identity and government. 
Tepe further outlines the contradictory methods, stating Kemal used “…Islamic terms to 
emphasize the religious unity of the emerging nation, (while) calling for a redefinition of 
some traditional practices at the same time.” 47 This effort used obvious ethno-national 
definitions of citizenship but uniquely inserted Islam into this interpretation in order to 																																																								
44 Kazamias, Education and the quest for modernity in Turkey. 35. 
45 Kaplan, Sam. “Religious Nationalism: A Textbook Case from Turkey.” Comparative 
Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 25:3 (2005): 666. 
46 Taspinar, “The Old Turks’ Revolt: When Radical Secularism Endangers Democracy.” 
119. 
47  Tepe, Beyond Sacred and Secular: Politics of Religion in Israel and Turkey, 91. 
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gain its normative currency. It was conjoined with republican ideals and less influential 
liberal goals as well. Kemalist nationalism became a “juxtaposition of territory, religion 
and ethnicity.”48 49 
Opposite of its Ottoman predecessors the new Turkey rejected multi-culturalism. 
The new “secular” Republic of Turkey was in practice more exclusionary than the 
“Islamic” Ottoman Empire. 50 Minority groups across Turkey reacted loudly and violently 
in response to the government’s reliance on Kemalism’s blend of Pan-Turkism and Islam 
to define “Turkishness” and citizenship in the new state. While Kemalism’s republican 
citizenship discourse could be expanded to include all Turks, the religious and ethnic 
aspects transformed the philosophies that would go on to influence programmatic 
initiatives and policies. To quiet some minorities, Kemalists framed Turkishness as 
reliant upon loyalty to the Anatolian homeland. The Alevis, a non-Sunni Muslim 
minority were swayed by this argumentative practice. Kose explains, “The narrative of a 
common homeland was a valuable asset for the Turkish bureaucracy in maintaining the 
loyalties of Alevi citizens, since many Alevis had strong emotional and cultural 
attachments to the Anatolian homeland.”51 Alevis were additionally lured by the promise 
of secular society, highlighting the additional importance of republican ideals in the 
definition of “Who is a Turk?” and new collective identity. Before institutions were even 																																																								
48 Kose, Talha. “Between Nationalism, Modernism and Secularism: The Ambivalent 
Place of ‘Alevi Identities.” Middle Eastern Studies 49:4 (2013): 597. 
49 Donmez, “Beyond State-Led Nationalism: Ideal Citizenship for Turkey,” 6. 
50 Taspinar, “The Old Turks’ Revolt: When Radical Secularism Endangers Democracy,” 
119. 
51 Kose, “Between Nationalism, Modernism and Secularism: The Ambivalent Place of 
‘Alevi Identities,” 957. 
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created, Kemalists were layering citizenship discourse to gain acceptance. While this 
minority in particular aligned with the new regime, others continued to chafe under the 
early authoritarian rule. Turkish nationalism pandered to an assortment of groups, but 
was not met by full-scale success. 
 Eventually, Kemal effectively used his political heft to legitimize his own 
normative ideas, undermine opponents, and quiet disgruntled minorities. This dominance 
translated into control of coordinative discourse that became more and more domineering 
than truly coordinative. National narratives focused on Kemal’s military greatness and 
ability to lead, religious issues were framed as threats to the newly independent, and 
modern state and collective memories were created and emphasized to fabricate a 
national identity of “Turkishness”.  All of these efforts centered around Kemal’s attempts 
to define the new Turkish state and its citizens. To subdue religious groups and address 
Ottoman Islamist legacies, Kemal incorporated religion into government to ensure the 
continued domination of coordinative, policy discourse. The resulting Ministry of 
Religious Affairs simultaneously reflected the intentions of secularism, and subjugation 
of religion and religious forces. It additionally would reflect the restrictive definitions of 
citizenship and national identity. In creating a Ministry designed to quiet one groups, one 
interpretation of Islam was chosen- the one hand picked to unify “Turks.” With such 
narrow intentions for the role of the institution, not all minorities would be well 
represented. 
 Turkey’s discursive debates built on centuries of divides. Discursive struggles did 
happen before institutions were created, but Kemal’s monopolization of power meant 
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they were publically subdued. Pre-independence reforms instigated national 
considerations of citizenship and the Republic saw a triple use of liberal, republican and 
ethno-national justifications for new norms. Kemal’s determination to break away from 
Ottoman institutions and traditions was challenged by Ottomanists and Pan-Islamists. 
The power sharing “coalition” present at independence resulted from discourse coalitions 
and limited coordinative discourse. These were heavily tipped in Kemal’s favor. Early 
Turkish leadership was remarkably authoritarian in nature and did not meet significant 
opposition from the public (or attempt to convince the public of new initiatives rather 
than institute top down changes). Turkey’s independence was a critical moment and early 
decisions would lead to decades of unsolved debates. Ideologically, Israel faced similar 
pulls between secularists, religious groups, minorities and conservatives. While Turkey 
was able to draw on ethnic definitions, Israel had the additional complications of 
religious and social divisions. 
 
Israel: Past Separation, Contemporary Unity 
While Jews are often presented as one nationality, ethnicity, or religious group, 
they are like any other socially constructed community, with internal partitions. To detail 
ongoing debates at the time of Israeli independence, it is imperative to understand these 
divides. The two broad ethnic groups are the Ashkenazi and Sephardi Jews.52 
Ashkenazim originated in the Rhineland valley and eventually migrated to Poland, 
																																																								
52 Plural, Ashkenazim and Sephardim. 
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Lithuania and other Central and Eastern European countries.53 After the 17th century, 
these Jews adopted the “German rite”. Orthodox, Reform and Conservative Jewish 
congregations arose from this group.54  The Sephardic rite originated in Spain but North 
African and Middle Eastern Jews who resided under the Ottoman millet system adopted 
the Sephardic rite.55 56 Unlike European Jews who experienced more consistent 
discrimination, Sephardi Jews did not usually have to make a choice between 
assimilation or conservatism, and usually lived among regional populations. Differences 
between the Ashkenazim and Sephardim include cultural traditions, synagogue practices 
and until Hebrew was adopted in Israel, language. Neither rite is specifically political; 
divisions began as more cultural and social than ideological.  
Additional divisions were along ethnic or religious ideological lines. Judaism, like 
all religions, possesses a spectrum of religiosity, conservatism, and reformism. There are 
five major sects of Judaism, first divided between religious and non-religious. Within the 
religious, there are the Orthodox and the ultra-orthodox or Haredim.57 Orthodox, non-
Hasidic Jews can be seen as the centrists of Judaism. Haredim are either Hasidic or non-
Hasidic. Hasidic Jews originated in Eastern Europe while non-Hasidic hailed from 																																																								
53 Elath, Eliahu. Britannica, Academic edition, s.v. “Internet.” Chicago: Encyclopedia 
Britannica, 2013. http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/296740/Israel accessed 
December, 2013. 
54 Elath, Eliahu. Britannica, Academic edition, s.v. “Internet.” Chicago: Encyclopedia 
Britannica, 2013. http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/296740/Israel accessed 
December, 2013.  
55 Sephardim derives from “Sepharad,” the Jewish name for the Iberian Peninsula. These 
Jews lived in Spain until the late 1400s when they were driven out by the inquisition.  
56 Encyclopedia Britannica, "Sephardi (People)." Accessed March 10, 2014. 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/535030/Sephardi. 
57 Ben-Yehuda, Nachman. Theocratic Democracy: The Social Construction of Religious 
and Secular Extremism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (2010). 13. 
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Central and Western Europe. No matter the sect or rite, all Jews share key cultural 
artifacts, collective memories and a base level of “Jewishness.” These divisions are 
philosophically important, as they carry separate qualifications for acceptance to their 
communities. 
In contrast to the created Turkish nationalism at the time of independence, the 
Jewish narrative is centuries old. It is defined by the longstanding yearning to return to 
the land of the Temple and commitment to maintaining strong ties throughout the 
diaspora. Tadmor-Shimony underlines the importance of biblical Israel as a geographical 
entity: “The link between the Jewish People, the Land of Israel, and their connection to 
Zion, is a desire, recognized for many years that proves the existence of an ancient ethnic 
identity.”58 Unlike the Turks, Jews had long lost control of Israel, and the modern 
iteration of the nation offered an opportunity to create an Israeli collective memory and a 
unified sense of nationalism. United by their faith, Jews are required to remember Zion in 
times of celebration, and yearnings for Zion are communicated in prayers, liturgical 
poetry, and various customs.”59  The cultural artifact of certainty in the inherent right of 
Jews to return to Israel spanned nations. 
Before the Yishuv, in the diaspora community, debates raged on the merits of 
Zionism and other political motivations for a Jewish state. One major factor ideological 
impetus was the early 20th century movements of Enlightenment, liberalism and 
individualism. Western European Jews had mixed experiences of acceptance as citizens 																																																								
58 Tadmor-Shimony, Tali. “Yearning for Zion in Israeli Education: Crating a Common 
National Identity.” Journal of Jewish Identities 6:1 (2013): 2. 
59 Tadmor-Shimony, “Yearning for Zion in Israeli Education: Crating a Common 
National Identity.” 6. 
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in newly nationalistic states, but Eastern European Jewish communities struggled to gain 
recognition as equal citizens.60  As a result, Eastern European Jews more fervently 
maintained their Jewish national identity, while Western European Jews often 
surrendered it in favor of European identities.61 Continent wide anti-Semitism persisted, 
however, and ultimately Jews internationally began to call for a Jewish state. Settlers 
began to move en masse to Palestine, hoping for a Zion to finally accept them.  
In the British mandate Palestine, during the Yishuv period, Jewish settlement 
communities separated by ideology functioned as nearly complete sub states, each with 
different aims for the future of a Jewish nation state (and conceptualizations for 
memberships in the community, a precursor to philosophies of citizenship). In Palestine 
and abroad, Zionist, Orthodox, and ultra-Orthodox movements characterized Ashkenazi 
Jews while Sephardic Jews discourse remained splintered and not influential in the 
Yishuv period.  
 Zionism was the pre-eminent topic of discourse in the Yishuv and diaspora 
communities. At its core, Zionism supported the establishment of Jewish state in the 
lands of Biblical Israel. Zionism represented a political Judaism, as it gained prominence 
internationally; it garnered support for an independent Jewish state. 62  Theodor Herzl 
first articulated Zionism and claimed its origins in Jewish tradition that encourages belief 
reestablishment of Zion; he argued Zionism was built on the artifacts of Judaism itself. 
To center the growing movement, Herzl formed the First Zionist Congress in 1897. 																																																								
60 Parzen, Herbert. A Short History of Zionism. New York: Herzl Press. 1962, 14. 
61 Parzen, A Short History of Zionism, 19. 
62 Tepe, Beyond Sacred and Secular: Politics of Religion in Israel and Turkey, 76. 
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Herzl organized the Zionist Congress as a forum with the mission to “…create a 
publicly recognized and legally secured home for the Jewish people in Palestine.”63 The 
operative clauses attached to this mission included;  
1. The systemic promotion of the settlement of Palestine by 
Jewish farmers, laborers and artisans. 2. The Organization of 
Jewry into local and general bodies in conformity with the laws 
of their respective communities. 3. The strengthening of Jewish 
sentiment and national consciousness. 4. The initiation of steps to 
attain such government assistance as may be necessary for 
achieving the aim of Zion.”  
Amidst these decrees Herzl continued to argue that the Jewish question was, 
overall, a national question that could only be solved in a state where Jews were the 
ethnic and religious majority. He wrote that, “Only cultural, secular nationalism would 
transform Jewish minorities into a distinct nation-state and normalize them as a member 
of the family of modern nation-states.” 64 Herzl emphasized that a Jewish state would be 
secular, liberal, and free of clericalism: religion and state would be strictly separate,” 65 
but the feasibility of this vision was always doubtful. 
Zionists that immigrated to Palestine were usually Eastern European Orthodox 
Jews that arrived after the 1905 failure of the Russian Revolution. They emphasized 
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Zionist-Socialist goals, “especially the use of Jewish labor on Jewish land.”66 These Jews 
focused on both liberal and ethno-national definitions of citizenship. These communities 
relied on participation in the community to qualify for acceptance and membership.67  
Hasidic Central European Jews immigrated to Palestine in two major waves in 
1919 and 1923. Many were active in labor organizations like the Zionists and provided 
agricultural and industrial support in the growing economy of the Yishuv. 68  At this time, 
the Yishuv was largely egalitarian and lacked major class divides. Most immigrants 
participated in the agricultural sector of the Palestinian economy. Whether they 
subscribed to Zionist Socialist views or more religious motivations, their coordinative 
discourse of this time emphasized Jewish unity over divisive disagreements. Truly 
coordinative, ideas and actors entered debates freely. Since communities were separate 
and autonomous, rhetoric avoided questions of normative beliefs and all found common 
cause in the very tangible goal of establishing a Jewish state.  
The last major Yishuv group consisted of Orthodox Western European Jews. This 
wave coincided with major international changes after World War I and significantly 
altered the Yishuv community. Less concerned with socialism or traditional practices 
most of these Jews aimed for an incremental separation of state and religion, similar to 
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the Western European nation-state system.69 In day-to-day life, Orthodox Jews adhered to 
religious traditions, but were active in secular civil society. Many of these immigrants 
were physicians, engineers, musicians and PhDs with diverse skills. Distinctively middle 
class, they expanded the political and economic landscape of the Yishuv, and enhanced 
the non-Socialist liberal orientation, and increasing discussions of the future ideology and 
government of an Israeli state. Many of these Jews supported Ben-Gurion in his support 
of a secular state that employed laïcité.70 71 
Within the Yishuv, questions of citizenship remained within communities; each 
had its own basic definition of “Who is a Jew?” Zionists were by far the most vocal 
group and they employed a multitude of tactics to gain support. Their continued 
secularism alienated many Jews who saw it as “nonconformist and deviant.”72 Hasidic 
Jewish communities had strong advocacy coalitions of religious authorities (active in 
mandate courts and other institutions), community leaders, and more that adhered to more 
traditional lifestyles. Orthodox Western Jews sought refuge in Palestine and while 
significant, did not yet constitute a singular vision other than a mild support for 
secularism. Divisions fell by the wayside during the War of Independence. Many 
individuals rose to prominence, but David Ben-Gurion represented the face of the Jewish 
fight for independence. David Ben-Gurion was the Executive Head of the Western 
Zionist Organization and head of the Jewish Agency, and therefore, the de facto leader of 																																																								
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the Yishuv. A Zionist and a pragmatist, Ben-Gurion knew more traditional Judaism 
would have to be incorporated to the Jewish state. Like Turkey, Israel would ultimately 
rely on all three discourses of citizenship to create a singular Israeli nationalism. 
Employing pre-existing cultural artifacts, Israel relied heavily on a Jewish narrative. 
Therefore incorporation of religion into government was expected, but in the midst of 
independence compromises, conservative Orthodox forces gained control of the 
Religious Ministry. In doing so, they gained power to define “Jewishness” as a national 
philosophy. While “Turkishness” was important in the abstract, “Why is a Jew?” would 
have very real implications for life (and immigration to) the Jewish state. Like Turkey’s 
Kemal, Ben-Gurion struck an uneasy alliance with conservative religious forces that 
would carry long lasting consequences. 
 
Impacts of Division 
Independent Turkey and Israel were met with disparate populations, new 
territorial boundaries, violent independence wars, and an opportunity to create entirely 
new nation states. Tepe draws a stark comparison, stating, “This definition of an 
exogenous Turkish identity matches the parallel construction of the Israeli identity.” 73 
Yet each encountered powerful religious forces that called for the primacy of religion in 
inspiring laws, norms and society. 
 At this stage of statehood, coordinative discourse and resulting alliances of 
advocacy collations stood poised to influence the course of each nation. Conservatives 																																																								
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and secularists had the support of their constituencies and continued to advocate unique 
narratives of citizenship. Ultimately, elites compromised to blend ethno-national and 
republican philosophies of citizenship that was immediately narrowed by religious 
sectarianism via Religious Ministries. By attempting to placate and sideline leaders of 
religious groups, each country inadvertently chose very narrow definitions of Turkishness 
and Jewishness. These similar occurrences would go on to override institutional legacies 
present in each country and create decades of dispute.  
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[II] Institutions produced  
 Sentient actors, advocacy coalitions, and their coordinative discourse produce 
institutions that reflect philosophies, programs and policies of the time. Discourse 
determines the normative rules to be adopted. Power sharing is determined by discursive 
coalitions and enshrined in initial institutional agreements. In Turkey, Kemal dominated 
any power sharing agreement with communicative force. Kemalists rode the tide of 
military success, propelled by nationalist tools to subordinate Islamist and Ottomanist 
forces. Rather than craft an agreement, Kemal and early leaders quelled Islamist power 
allowing them to control religious functions and responsibilities via the Presidency of 
Religious Affairs (under the government’s watchful eye). Israel’s coalitional alliances 
were much more visible in the first years of Independence. Secular Zionist and religious 
Orthodox both held ideational and material sway in significant portions of the population. 
Methods of framing the new Israeli narrative were very controversial and nearly every 
decision of governance required extensive debate. To negotiate these anxieties, initial 
power sharing agreements were epitomized in the lack of a single Israeli constitution. 
Instead, Zionist, Orthodox and other factions crafted a government that would be 
characterized by coalitional governments and continuously shifting power sharing 
agreements.  
 Turkish and Israeli independence did not occur in a vacuum and joined a long 
history of negotiated agreements between state and religion. Ottoman institutional and 
ideational legacies influenced both countries. Competing groups aimed for different 
iterations of laicism, and codification of agreements reached by discursive coalitions is 
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highlighted in a variety of power sharing agreements like the Ministries of Religion. 
Ultimately, each country built religious institutions as a political policy solution for 
broader disagreements. Ironically, this would backfire and reassign the power of defining 
citizenship from the general government to those ministries. This section will work to 
understand the legacies of the Ottoman Empire, followed by a discussion of what 
institutions were produced from discursive coalitions described in the last section. Both 
leaders relegated the Ministries of Religion to religious forces and inadvertently failed 
their laïcité efforts before they began. In the Turkish case, it will become clear that 
amidst competing ideational aims, a compromise was struck to enshrine both Kemal’s 
definition of “Turkishness” and Islamist forces’ goals of a narrow interpretation of Islam. 
In Israel we see a parallel course of events; the Yishuv period facilitated a myriad of 
disagreements, and state institutions preserved 1948 advocacy (and political) coalitions 
and an underdeveloped idea of citizenship.  
  
Ottoman Institutional Legacies 
The Ottoman Empire administration was a vast, dynamic institution, with broad 
influence in the region. It was, at its core, a Sunni caliphate, and religion influenced all 
aspects of government. Aral summarizes, “The Ottomans believed in a state based on 
their religion, i.e. Islam. They formulated this through the concept din-u-devlet, i.e. a 
state governed by religion as well as religion in the service of the state.” 74 The 
institutions established under the Empire left legacies that each independence movement 																																																								
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had to contend with and negotiate. The Ottoman administration focused on the rights of 
collectives (rather than individuals) and on justice (rather than freedom). 75 Kemalists 
abolished nearly every institution while Israelis built on Ottoman and British systems, but 
the two countries eventually arrived at similar institutional set ups as a result of 
independence era compromises between laïcité seeking leaders and counter coalitions of 
conservatives. The political compromises struck following the Wars of Independence 
were a result of years of internal coordinative discourse. Coordinative discourse between 
Kemalists, Islamists and the rare minority group led to coordinative agreements on 
programs and policies, but a lack of agreement at the philosophical level meant 
institutions produced by these agreements were poised to upset tenuous agreements. 
 
Kemal vs. Islamists: Laicism Realized 
Institutional Legacies and Competing Aims 
The greatest obstacle to establishing a new, legitimate Turkish government was 
contending with Ottoman institutional and philosophical legacies that intertwined religion 
and government. To counter this, the Young Turks and Mustafa Kemal introduced a 
radical form of westernization and secularization. The 1920s and 1930s saw top-down 
modernization, led by military men. In 1922, the Caliphate76 and the Sultanate77 were 
both abolished. A new caliph, Abudlmecid II was elected, but this new office 
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acknowledged the sovereignty of the nation and the national assembly. 78 The caliphate 
held centuries’ worth of legitimacy from “leading” the Muslim world. Kemal 
fundamentally altered the proclaimed source of legitimacy for this leadership, and stated 
that the caliphate was now a political, not a religious, institution and it had always sought 
to control the Muslim world and was now only kept intact for historical and cultural 
reasons.” 79 This shift is an example of Kemal’s efforts to tie Turkish citizenship and 
nationalism to ancient Ottoman achievements, before the involvement of Islam. 
Turkish leaders additionally discarded the Arabic alphabet, Islamic education, and 
an array of minority religious brotherhoods. In their new government, they utilized 
Western legal codes, Western time and weight measurements, and the Latin alphabet. 80 
The government successfully appropriated Ottoman symbols, thus controlling discourse 
and establishing itself as the “founder of a new era” while simultaneously assuming the 
role of the fallen Ottoman Empire.81 Thus, Ottoman artifacts were demolished and each 
ideological group envisioned new ones to fill the void.  
 While Kemalists clearly attempted to complete secular and republican aims, 
conservative forces did influence some debates, especially regarding Islam. 
Conservatives advocated for the preservation and modification of the contemporary 
Sunni Hanafi Islam. 82 Prior to Turkish independence and the Turkish revolution, 																																																								
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Islamists gathered public support through calling for greater respect for the Sultan and 
Caliph. This religious mobilization of the populous was immediately interpreted as a 
threat, and the Committee of Union and Progress and Young Turk elites realized Islamist 
power to counter secularization.83 Upon Kemalists’ rise to power, they framed Islamists 
as backward, harking back to the dysfunction of the Ottoman Empire. 84 Islamists were 
related to traitors, reactionaries, fanatics, and bigoted. 85 By transforming the narrative, 
Kemalists effectively removed Islamists from positions of influence and isolated those 
involved in advocacy coalitions. 
While the Young Turks and Kemalism idealized a secular government without 
religious influences, they quickly realized such a feat was impossible with such a 
religious population. As a compromise, they advocated a contained version of Islam. 
Turning to laicism and laiklik, they incorporated religious advocacy coalitions into the 
government, attempting to kill two birds with one stone- quiet their competitors and 
control the Islam used in new definitions of “Turkishness”. This also kept Islamists in 
sight of the highly suspicious government. The freedom of religion, then, entailed a 
protection of “individualized” religion. 86 Ottoman era religious functions would be 
moved under the purview of the new Directorate of Religious Affairs that regulated 																																																																																																																																																																					
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almost every aspect of Islam: its imams, sermons and other services. 87 Kemal and his 
contemporaries narrowly won normative and cognitive philosophical battles of 
independence years and gained the legitimacy necessary to revise Turkey’s official 
relationship with religion.  
 
Codifying Discourse: Islam Enshrined 
In order to clear the institutional “room” for a new institution for religious affairs 
that subscribed to Kemalist and laiklik principles, the Turkish government passed Act no. 
429 on March 3, 1924 that abolished the Ministries of Seriyye and Evkaf. 88 Moving 
away from a ministry within the cabinet, the Turkish Republic established the Presidency 
of Religious Affairs as an administrative bureaucracy in the Constitution of 1924. 89  
The laws establishing and defining the Presidency of Religious Affairs are 
contained in multiple sources of legislation. Article 129 of the 1924 Constitution states, 
“…and the Presidency of Religious Affairs will be formed as a part of the Republic for 
the implementation of all provisions concerning faith and prayer of the religion of Islam, 
and the administration of religious organizations,” 90 where Article 136 continues the 
aims of the Presidency of Religious Affairs are “to execute the works concerning the 
beliefs, worship, and ethics of Islam, enlighten the public about their religion, and 																																																								
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administer the sacred worshipping places.” 91 It is also to, “to direct all requirements and 
implications concerning beliefs and prayers of the religion of Islam an to run religious 
establishments.” Kemal moved any item related to faith, worship or the administration of 
religious organizations under the purview of the Presidency of Religious Affairs. To 
coordinate these efforts, a Religious Affairs High Council worked to “define, regulate 
and improve” religious affairs in Turkish society. 92 This council was to be drawn from 
people who had mastered ‘Akaid-I islamiyye and ulumu ser’iyye’ (Islamic sciences and 
jurisprudence).93 This council epitomizes the new Republic’s adherence to its Islamic 
past, but emphasis on new civil codes and legal systems. The few laws that determined 
the future of the Presidency of Religious Affairs encompassed both ethno-national and 
republican philosophical bases, exemplifying when a philosophical idea motivates an 
institutional programmatic solution.  
The Constitution placed the Presidency of Religious Affairs under the purview of 
the Prime Minister, but other than the Religious Affairs High Council, made sparse 
suggestions to the intended internal structure.94 A few years after its establishment, the 
first administration’s Budget Act (1927) included a permanent positions table within the 
Presidency of Religious Affairs. It set a preliminary organizational structure until the 
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Assembly further detailed internal arrangements (which finally occurred in 1935). 95 Most 
importantly, the Presidency of Religious Affairs was a relatively autonomous 
“administrative” unit signaling the elites’ goal of separating the new institution from its 
potential sacredness. 96 The lack of internal structure dictated by initial laws highlight the 
lack of importance dedicated to this ministry. It was also a mistake on the part of the 
Kemalist government as conservative forces entrenched their ideals. 
As with most new institutions, the Presidency of Religious Affairs evolved 
quickly in its first years of existence. In June 1931 another fiscal budget act transferred 
the management and personnel of all mosques and prayer rooms to the Presidency- 
General for Foundations. This was a reduction of responsibility for the Presidency of 
Religious Affairs and an indication of continuing debates between Kemalists and 
Islamists. 97  
The entire establishment of the Presidency of Religious Affairs was a hugely 
political process guaranteed to garner serious debate. Kemalism hinged upon a 
“sterilized” Islam, contained in the government institution and channels. 98 In order to 
accomplish this, Kose states, “the Republican establishment tried to create a ‘local’ 
Turkish Islam that was completely ‘apolitical’ at the popular level. In addition, this vision 
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of Islam was meant to exclude the ‘low Islam’ or ‘Sufi Islam.”99 To efficiently quell 
popular Islamist forces (outside of the political sphere) and seize their support, Kemal 
retroactively ensured the Presidency of Religious Affairs enshrined “true” Sunni 
Orthodox Islam. Its commentary on the hadith and the Quran were based on the Sunni 
tradition, particularly Hanafi principles. 100 The Presidency of Religious Affairs’ Islam 
thus incorporated conservative Islamist visions, but not smaller sects and other 
minorities. As Kose mentions, “This specific form of laicization made neither the Sunni 
cemaats and tariqats nor the Alevi communities happy.”101  
This lack of inclusion and therefore lack of representation in a government 
institution is markedly undemocratic. In principle, Kemalist secularism guaranteed the 
rights and freedoms of all religions, but in practice, efforts to command Islamist forces 
resulted in discrimination against all not adherent to the “proper” Islam of Turkey. 
Turkey’s independence era definition of Turkishness was incredibly narrow, and limited 
citizenship discourse to mainly ethno-national ideals, with only a few republican ideals 
included. As a result, the institution produced mirrored these biases. In the next section, 
challenges to the institution will be met with fierce opposition since initial entrenchment 
followed such a narrow citizenship. In Israel, a similar process occurred as Ben-Gurion 
and his contemporaries worked to transform pre-independence institutions while 
simultaneously debating the future of Israeli citizenship.  																																																								
99 Kose, “Between Nationalism, Modernism and Secularism: The Ambivalent Place of 
‘Alevi Identities,” 595. 
100 Kutlu, Sonmez. “The Presidency of Religious Affairs’ Relationship with Religious 
Groups (Sects/Sufi Order) in Turkey.” Muslim World 98 (2008):  249. 
101 Kose, “Between Nationalism, Modernism and Secularism: The Ambivalent Place of 
‘Alevi Identities,” 596. 
 	44 
Israel: A Land Dreamt of, A Nation Realized  
Institutional Legacies, Competing Aims 
Aside from obvious external tensions, the settlement of Israel was riddled with 
complications. Under Ottoman rule, Palestine was treated much like other holdings, and 
government was very decentralized. Primarily settled by traditional Arab communities, 
Palestine always possessed minorities, and in the late 1800s Palestine absorbed new 
Jewish communities. By the early 1880’s no less than 5 major European immigrant 
Jewish settlements were taking root in Palestine. 102 Some Jewish communities integrated 
with pre-existing towns and cities, while others created parallel governance structures. 
Local groups and communities coordinated most social, cultural and economic activities. 
103 The Ottoman Jewish millet was lead by the hacam bashi (chief rabbi) of Jerusalem, 
also called rishon le-zion. 104 Jewish courts were separated under one Sephardi and one 
Ashkenazi chief rabbi; each community functioned under these separate courts. 105 This 
was the institutional solution to fundamentally different views of the source of law. In the 
Jewish tradition, laws derive from two sources of authority: dina d’malchuta dina (the 
laws of the land where one resides are binding) and takanot (regulations) established by 
the community.”106 
The practice of dividing Sephardi and Ashkenazi courts was continued and 																																																								
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expanded under the British mandate of Palestine. To create a semblance of unity, the 
mandate created a Supreme Rabbinical Council that would be jointly led by the chief 
rabbis. 107 These inherently religious courts had jurisdiction over personal-status matters 
such as marriage, divorce, alimony, and confirmation of wills. 108 In conjunction with this 
highly divided judicial system, the Yishuv community persisted in its divisions.  
 The question of “Who is a Jew?” dominated the Yishuv period. Each ethnic and 
religious group desired different characteristics, and disagreed on the method of defining 
citizenship. Tense disagreements arose, especially between Sephardim and Ashkenazi 
communities. After decades of living autonomously with other religions, the Sephardim 
were more amenable to integrating with existing society, while the Ashkenazi were more 
intent on establishing their ideal Israel. This schism existed within an ethno-national and 
republican discourse at the philosophical level of generality. Zionists placed socialist, 
liberal ideals alongside Jewish identity.109 Their republican definition reflected their 
Western European origins and goal of integrating with Western society. The equality of 
liberal and Jewish motivations in this discourse posed a direct threat to more religious 
communities’ way of life. Although citizenship discourse highlighted differences within 
the Yishuv, the broader Jewish community at least agreed on the collective goal of an 
independent Jewish state.  
 Once Israel became a true nation, ideas were no longer abstract discourse, but the 
source of programmatic and policy solutions Israelis could take without the intervention 																																																								
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of the British. Determining “Who is a Jew?” was not only a philosophical concern; 
Israel’s final decision would hold significant implications for the millions trying to 
immigrate to the new Jewish state. Ben-Gurion advocated for a broader definition of 
“Jewishness”, including any individual who considered himself Jewish, who conducted 
himself as a Jew and who was willing to accept the responsibilities of Jewish 
identification. 110 Secular Zionists argued that it was under the purview of the state to 
determine Jewish nationality, while the Orthodox Rabbinate declared this definition was 
religious law, and therefore under their jurisdiction. 111 Previously, only the Chief 
Rabbinate (and the Orthodox parties that controlled it) could determine who was a Jew, 
and the Orthodox advocacy coalition fought for this broader definition. At independence 
they insisted on a narrower, halachic definition, fearing that a broader definition would 
not only “dilute Israel’s Jewishness”, but also that their exclusive authority would be 
undermined.112 The Orthodox eventually coalesced into a strong political party, reflexive 
of their growing advocacy coalition. Ben-Gurion ultimately struck a deal with Orthodox 
parties: in exchange for support on his security issues, his Mapal (Labor) party would 
support their control of marriage, divorce, conversion and other personal issues.113 This 
alliance would go on to define Israeli politics for decades. While on the surface this looks 
to be an issue at the party level, it in fact stems from a much deeper debate on the 
cognitive definition of Jewishness. 																																																								
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Codifying Discourse: Ideological Alliances of Peace 
Without a constitution, Israel’s assorted bills, laws and acts create the skeleton of 
the state. As mentioned, Israel at independence possessed more factions (with stronger 
factions) than Turkey. The Orthodox advocacy coalition constituted the third largest 
political advocacy group, and was very effective at extracting concessions. Ben-Yehuda 
gives an example of the potency of Orthodox forces, “In 1948, Haredi party Agudat Israel 
demanded and received four political concessions: (I) the legal day of rest in Israel will 
be Saturday, (2) every state kitchen for Jews will be Kosher, (3) all legal matters 
governing personal status (for example, marriage and divorce) will be determined by 
Halakha,114 and (4) the autonomy of religious education will be guaranteed (that is, the 
establishment of independent, state-sponsored orthodox and ultraorthodox religious 
educational systems.)115 The Orthodox movement mobilized support remarkably well and 
unlike Turkey, could not be entirely sidelined or subordinated by secular forces. 
One of the first (albeit minor) cabinet positions created in 1948 was the Minister 
of Religions and War Victims.116 This ministry was immediately placed under the control 
of the Orthodox in a political concession to maintain secular control of other facets of the 
government. In a move to placate them, the Orthodox were actually granted a ministry 
that would go on to influence core components of Israeli society. The Ministry of 																																																								
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Religious Services is closely tired to the religious courts in Israel, under the Chief 
Rabbinate. The Chief Rabbinate and the Supreme Rabbinical Council influence any 
Knesset law relevant to religious questions or the administrative duties of the Ministry of 
Religious Services. Their judgments on controversial issues (based on traditional Jewish 
law, or halacha) in turn influence the political system by mobilizing their followers and, 
in turn, prominent Orthodox parties. 117118 Again, the parties mentioned are representative 
of a part of advocacy coalitions and since they exist in conjunction with the ministry, 
some of their leaders were sentient actors that could introduce, mold and propel ideas 
within the institution.  
The Ministry of Religious Services historically holds an array of responsibilities, 
including: appointment of religious councils, provision of shortfall in approved budgets 
for religious facilities and services, the monitoring of budget implementation, supply of 
financial assistance to yeshivas, renovation and construction of physical facilities, 
construction and renovation of synagogues and ritual baths, maintenance of public order, 
facilitation of religious ties with diaspora, the monitoring of the observance of kashruth in 
public and government institutions, maintenance of religious services of non-Jewish 
groups, provided religious education for poor, provided, ritual articles to immigrants, 
educational institutions and support of the chief- rabbinate and managed rabbinical 
courts. 119 
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Additionally, the Ministry of Religious Services oversees religious services to the 
public via religious councils. There are more than 170 religious courts in Israel and local 
rabbis assist the Ministry of Religious Services. The Ministry of Religious services 
allocates much of its budget to the ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) educational and social 
services, religious and educational institutions (Yeshivas), religious youth movements, 
religious cultural institutions (which are institutions that hold Torah lessons for the ultra-
Orthodox public) and the religious research institutions.120 Shestreet states, “This status 
of the Rabbinate…illustrates the strong association of state and the religious bodies in 
Israel.”121 Orthodox forces determined the general structure of the Ministry of Religious 
Services and used their bit of government control to favor their interpretation of Judaism.  
Since the Ministry of Religious Services was a component of early political 
compromise, the Orthodox have always maintained control and influence via this 
ministry. Like Turkey, this led to the adoption of a particular (conservative) interpretation 
of Judaism and excluded minorities within and outside of Judaism. Like Turkey, the 
Ministry of Religious Services entrenched Orthodox power and guaranteed a permanent 
position of influence. The Ministry of Religious Services was a blow to Israeli assertions 
of secularism and led to claims of failure to ensure freedom of religion. As Shestreet 
points out, the freedom of religion is under the Ministry of Religious Services and 
Orthodox dominance; every Israeli is subject to Orthodox interpretation and rules in the 
civil areas of marriage, divorce and other social areas. There is simply no secular option. 																																																								
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122 The religious policy actors successfully secured continued ability to define Israeliness 
by its ability to define Jewishness. The Israeli story highlights similar problems of 
independence that never settled on a permanent, accepted philosophy of citizenship. 
Turkey and Israel were able to create policies and programs that relied upon uneasy 
alliances and coalitions and most importantly- loosely defined conceptions of citizenship. 
While this solved initial problems of government, it did not bode well for the stability of 
institutions. 
 
Takeaways from Independence Era Solutions 
 Both Turkey and Israel rose from the ashes of violent wars with secularists, 
conservatives and other groups attempting to guide citizenship and nationalist discourse. 
Each had traditionalist forces clamoring for the presence of religion in the new nation 
state. Secular groups pushed for a wall of separation and republican values and principles 
to inspire governance. Where Turkey’s Kemal was able to displace old legacies yet not 
eliminate religious influences, he simply relegated Islamic actors and advocacy collations 
to the PRA. A secularist approach legitimized the new Republic and moved it away from 
the remnants of the Ottoman Empire but alienated minorities not included in new 
definitions of citizen. Israel’s Ben-Gurion similarly encountered challenges to his ideals 
of laicism. To accommodate the many different forces, early governments granted some 
autonomy to Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox advocacy and political coalitions and created 
the Ministry of Religious Services as a political concession established via coordinative 																																																								
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discourse. Both Turkey and Israel inadvertently allowed conservative forces to define 
citizenship on the basis of religion when they granted religious parties the Religious 
Ministries. The lack of oversight into the internal structure of the Ministries meant 
religious forces quickly entrenched their interests and began programs and policies based 
on their particular philosophies. Their conceptualizations of citizenship rested on 
particular veins of Islam and Judaism and effectively altered the nationalist discourse. 
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[III] Evolutions 
 The Presidency of Religious Affairs and the Ministry of Religious Services were 
creations of political compromise, intended to satisfy religious groups so that centrists 
could lead other, more influential portions of government. All institutions change, 
however, and the Presidency of Religious Affairs and the Ministry of Religious Services 
display institutional evolution amidst extremely instable government atmospheres. From 
coups in Turkey to coalition government after coalition government in Israel, neither 
government nor its institutions escaped scrutiny or controversy. Domestic turmoil meant 
alliances were shaken and new openings for ideas and change appeared. Whether or not 
those ideas succeeded relied upon support within the institution, and interactions of actors 
and their coalitions.  
Institutions are produced on initial power sharing agreements between advocacy 
coalitions of sentient actors who have successfully led coordinative discourse on 
philosophies, programs and policies and convinced the public of their merits via 
communicative discourse. By investigating shifts of motivations, interests, and alliances, 
it is possible to identify power adjustments stemming from the “coalitional foundations 
on which institutions rest.”123 Within institutions, actors’ abilities, goals and strategies are 
altered and “the decisions of religious partisans and parties rest on and nest in multi-
layered structures, and that is not only structural but ideational space.”124 Institutional 
context is where ideas possess meaning, where discourse has communicative force, and 																																																								
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where collective actions make a difference. 
 In Israel and Turkey, Ministries of Religion underwent layering, displacement, 
drift and conversion at the hands of political actors. There are always pressures for an 
institution to change, whether they are internal or external. Sentient actors, whose 
motives are constrained by institutions, introduce incremental changes. What ultimately 
makes pushes for institutional change successful is the ability to alter national discourse 
and garner adequate support for the change. In Turkey and Israel, minority groups 
attempted to change the religious status quo to no avail. When more powerful external 
religious pressures threatened to alter previous coalitions, the ministries responded. In 
Turkey, the Presidency of Religious Affairs moved to isolate itself from Islamist forces, 
which successfully avoided direct confrontation. In Israel, the Orthodox controlling the 
Ministry of Religious Services fought off potential changes in funding abilities and 
renegotiated the coalition that underlined the Ministry of Religious Services’ very 
existence.  Communicative force is key in achieving institutional change and by 
investigating case where attempts failed and succeeded, it will be clearer how and where 
force must be applied. Why that force exists in the first place is a product of interactions 
that will shed additional insight. Changes were suggested in both Turkey and Israel 
because both nations experienced socio-cultural cleavages. In Turkey, a hierarchy of a 
modernist center and the conservative periphery mirrored divides between Ashkenazim 
and Sephardim in Israel. Divisions between secular, modern Orthodox, and ultra-
Orthodox forces further exacerbated the Israeli divides. 125 For each ministry, I will 																																																								
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explore a proposed change that did not garner enough support, and seek an explanation 
for one successful alteration to the status quo. In this comparison, the power of ideational 
force will be seen, and the amplifying abilities of institutional focus heard.  
 
Turkey: External Threats, Internal Responses 
External Pressures 
Since the PRA’s founding, it faced internal and external pressures. Islamist 
groups pushed for more recognition and control within the government, and the ability to 
influence Muslim life within Turkey. Outside government control, these Islamist 
coalitions have continued to mobilize populations to influence the government’s 
treatment of religion. Since Kemalists and their successors never focused on the 
periphery of society or the complete legitimization of the Islamist power of the 
government, this population is remarkably simple to rally and mobilize.126 
127Additionally, minority groups claim they are severely underrepresented. The PRA’s 
refusal to accept varied interpretations of Islam led to consistent critiques of the 
institution’s democratic nature. Goezyadin states, “This is where the Presidency of 
Religious Affairs is criticized most frequently and severely with respect to equality.”128 
Minority groups are especially affected by the narrow nature of the Ministry rooted in 																																																								
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Kemal’s narrow definition of Turkishness. For decades, the Presidency of Religious 
Affairs has been far from welcoming to minority groups that are often not even 
recognized by the government of being different.   
While the Alevi population and identity politics surrounding them has not 
garnered the same attention as the Kurdish minority in Turkey, it is no less of a divisive 
issue. While they petition for recognition, Alevis fear being “homogenized” under the 
government and PRA’s Hanafi Sunni Islam.129  Within the Alevi community itself, there 
is debate over whether the Alevi identity is an ethnic, sectarian or political one. Different 
Alevi groups prefer different terms, including a ‘sectarian group’, an ‘ethnic group’, 
‘faith based social movement’ or ‘true Muslims.’130 Ozmen defines Alevis as a distinctive 
group that adheres to Alevism;  
“Alevism is a religious thought pattern embellished by some beliefs influential on 
the Anatolian lands for some period, such as shamanism, Buddhism, and 
Manichaeism, and later integrated with Sunni Islam. For this reason, we can say 
that Turkish Alevism, in other words, Anatolian Alevism, emerged as the 
nomadic Turkmen and Turkish clans accepted Islam and combined Sunni Islam 
with some of their already existing religious and mystic beliefs and traditions.”131  
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Alevis are Turkish speaking and of Turk/Turcoman origin,132 but since they do 
not subscribe to the Hanafi Sunni tradition, they reside outside of the Kemalist definition 
of citizenship. Unique religious and cultural qualities mean Alevis are a minority group 
without a status.133 During the War of Independence, Kemal struck a deal with the Alevi 
leadership, promising freedom of religion and worship in the new regime for their 
support.134 Instead, the new regime created the Presidency of Religious Affairs with the 
intention of subordinating political Islamists and no provisions for minorities were made. 
In early Turkey, there were no political avenues to voice discontent and Alevis refrained 
from campaigning to change the discriminatory system.135  
 The tumultuous 1950s in Turkey led to an open party system. During this period, 
the public sphere burgeoned and expanded to an array of deviant identity expressions. 
These changes led to an increased call for minority and religious recognition. Both Alevi 
and Islamist forces began to politically mobilized and immediately aimed for the PRA.  
 
Attempted Changes: Alevis on the Outside 
 After the turmoil of the 1950s, the military intervened for the first time in Turkish 
government.136 The coup of 1960 and the resulting 1961 Constitution “created active 																																																								
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citizens.”137 Alevi populations seized the rare moment and released two declarations. 
Alevi leaders declared Alevi loyalty to the state and went on to explain “that Alevism is 
the core of Islam and that they were Muslims themselves and should be represented as a 
separate sect of the Presidency of Religious Affairs just like the Sunnis.”138 In attempts to 
increase support, Alevis entered dialogue with other minority groups. Communicative 
discourse among religious minorities focused on the Presidency of Religious Affairs’ 
mishandling of religious differences and needs of specific groups. For example, in 
response to complaints of a shortage of mosques in rural regions, the Presidency of 
Religious Affairs continued to build mosques in Alevi areas but continued to appoint 
non-Alevi imams.139 Alevism and Baktashism were ignored in Friday sermons and 
religious publications.140 With the opening of the political system, Alevis articulated 
broad goals, but lacked the political organization and wherewithal to create true advocacy 
coalitions. Alevis simply could not coalesce to a point of discursive influence, and no 
sentient actors emerged prepared to argue and contest at the institutional level. Amidst 
internal debates of communal identity, Alevis were able to political mobilize but 
remained isolated from broader minority movements with different goals. 
 Even in their disorganization, Alevis and other groups pushed for change in the 
PRA. Their main goal was to fashion new departments within the Presidency of Religious 
Affairs that would address their specific demands. In 1963, riding a way of perceived 																																																								
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liberation; a law was proposed to create a Directory of Religious Sects within the PRA. 
Hopes were high, and minority groups rallied among themselves. Quite importantly, the 
Turkish population did not rally behind them, or the new ideas that would expand not 
only policies or programs of religious inclusion, but an entire philosophical change to the 
relationship between the state, religion and religious groups. The proposed law was 
resoundingly shut down the by Turkish government. The regime stated that the law 
would “pave the way” for sectarianism, and clearly signaled that minorities would in no 
time soon attain greater representation.141 Internal divisions were the downfall of Alevi 
efforts, since without a cohesive effort; no actors were catapulted to a place of discursive 
or institutional influence.142 Neither Turkish elites nor the public supported their efforts 
to gain religious recognition in what was supposedly a secular republic. As a result, no 
sentient actors championed their cause, and no institutional arrangement was 
renegotiated. Even to this day, the Alevi minority is under represented by the PRA.143  
 
Successful Changes: Layering for Isolation 
At the same time of Alevi attempts for recognition, elites within the Presidency of 
Religious Affairs realized the PRA’s exposure to populist pressures should they gain 
support (as Islamist forces potentially could). In response, the actors within the current 
coalition in power moved to isolate the institution from external influences. To do so, 																																																								
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they engaged in institutional layering. In June 1965, the government passed Act 633 that 
significantly shifted the duties and structure of the PRA. 144 This law sought to:  
a. To determine the duties and responsibilities of the Presidency of 
Religious Affairs in accordance with the principle of secularism and the 
freedom of religion and conscience indicated in the constitution; 
b. To bring under a unified law various regulative changes and 
amendments concerning the PRA; 
c. To provide financial support for the Presidency of Religious Affairs and 
make the institution attractive for young people who are equipped in the 
moral and positive sciences; 
d. To increase the number of those who have competence in scholarly 
studies on various religious topics and use the results of their studies to 
serve and enlighten society, and thus solidify the unity and integrity of the 
nation in matters of faith and moral principles by removing bigotry and 
superstition, which were not permitted by the religion of Islam.145 
This law also created the “Higher Council of Religious Affairs” with eleven 
members to be determined by an election and approved by the Cabinet. Additional 
responsibilities were granted to the PRA, including the taking of  “protective measures 
that maintain the loyalty of Muslim citizens to the national ideals.”146 A moral dimension 																																																								
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was added to the laundry list of Presidency of Religious Affairs duties in 1965. The new 
law stated, “The responsibilities of the Presidency of Religious Affairs are to direct what 
is related to the principles of beliefs, prayers and ethics of Islam and to enlighten society 
on matters of religion and to run places of worship.”147 These efforts were widely 
supported by those within the institution, since it enabled their larger visions for the 
ministry. 
This law set the stage for continued expansion of the Presidency of Religious 
Affairs, ultimately resulting in personnel education centers, and a directorate for foreign 
relations (providing for personnel who were to provide religious services to Turkish 
citizens living abroad) among other departments. Legal changes involved were initially 
administrative in nature, but led to government reliance on cabinet decrees rather than 
constitutional changes to adjust the Presidency of Religious Affairs. Since these laws, the 
Presidency of Religious Affairs has become incredibly difficult to alter or change, legally 
or informally by drift of policy implementation. In short, the Presidency of Religious 
Affairs effectively isolated itself, and became protected from future waves of peripheral 
pressure that could be applied by the national legislature.148  
The vast expansion of the Presidency of Religious Affairs is significant. With the 
increased internal bureaucracy, the Presidency of Religious Affairs now relied on 
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governmental decrees to adjust its internal functions. 149 This effectively isolated the 
Presidency of Religious Affairs against peripheral (i.e. Islamist and minority) forces. At 
the time, this was a deft move by institutional elites to subvert Islamist forces. By moving 
to protect the established methods of interaction between actors, the institution stalled 
other large-scale evolutions that would jeopardize the status quo. 
 
Lessons of Change  
The attempted and successful changes to the Presidency of Religious Affairs 
highlight the power of elites in transforming discourse and identifying pressures. In the 
case of the Alevis, popular opinion and discourse did not influence the elected political 
body of the Turkish National Assembly or influence the detached civil servants within 
the institution. At the same time, however, Islamist forces threatened to gain influence of 
the entire political system. Through institutional channels, and the interactions within 
institutions (and the discourse, coalitions, and policies that result) discursive communities 
can grow to advocacy coalitions, capable of real influence. Tepe underlines why this is 
important; “…the state’s role and power in society does not take a single form once its 
institutions emerge- the entire political system may undergo significant changes that 
modify the environments of social actors and alter their leverages to such an extent that 
once marginalized groups may decisively influence the outcomes of states’ actions.” 150 
To preserve Kemalist ideals of Turkishness, the Islamist forces had to be subordinated. 																																																								
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The initial set up of the Presidency of Religious Affairs keep religious forces within the 
parameters of republican government, and expansions of 1965 increased these 
institutional capabilities. 
 The Turkish case carries unfortunate predictions for Turkish democracy. The 
continued exclusion of Alevis and other religious minorities highlights the incapability of 
Kemal’s national identity to encompass all Turks. By so narrowly defining the religious 
aspects of Turkishness, and the subsequent enshrinement of those ideals in the Presidency 
of Religious Affairs placed Alevis in an uphill battle. Not only did the Alevis have to aim 
to change particular policies, but to accomplish real institutional evolution, they would 
have needed to incite philosophical and programmatic change as well. Without the proper 
support, it simply wasn’t possible. Successful change within the institution occurred 
when policy actors within the Presidency of Religious Affairs and other government 
sectors came to agree that the Presidency of Religious Affairs needed to maintain 
autonomy. An efficient advocacy coalition of a variety of actors saw their coordinative 
discourse come to fruition via tangible policy change. In Israel, a similar situation is seen. 
Orthodox forces were given control of the Ministry of Religious Services from the first 
coalitional government, and while minority efforts to change the program were 
unsuccessful, pushes for increased autonomy were. 
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Israel: Minority Attempts, Conservative Retaliations 
Pressures from Within 
 The central debate in Israel has always been the definition of “Who is a Jew?” 
From religious authorities to secular nationalists, the methods of characterizing a Jew are 
many. This problem is permanently relevant, as Israel (and the Zionist movement it 
derives from) is inherently Jewish.151 Additionally, individuals from around the world 
apply to immigrate to Israel every day, and in order to gain citizenship, they must be able 
to prove they are a Jew. Therefore, who is a Jew? Who is Israeli? Ben-Yehuda states, 
“Many political and governmental crises in this country can be traced to this whirlpool of 
tensions, which also served as a main topic for coalition governments. The issue here is 
deep and inherently divisive, because it touches the very essence of what Israel is or 
should be.”152 Peretz points out that only the Orthodox have a “clear-cut, unambiguous 
definition of who is a Jew, based on traditional Jewish law” which includes those whose 
mother is Jewish or those who have converted according to halacha.153 Since the creation 
of Israel, there have been non-Orthodox communities that are discriminated against and 
push for greater religious freedom. 154  
 The Orthodox community is undoubtedly a minority community, but with control 
of the Ministry of Religious Services and Chief Rabbinate Orthodox practices dominate 																																																								
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Israeli society. Decisions of the chief rabbinate affect the entirety of Israelis, especially in 
matters pertaining to personal status.155 Conservative and Reform rabbis are not allowed 
on the religious courts, do not carry out marriage ceremonies, cannot serve in the military 
rabbinate, and do not receive salaries from the state.156 Additionally, the state finances 
religious institutions, especially Orthodox-Jewish ones. This influence is doubled by the 
significant political power of the ultra-orthodox parties in the Knesset.157 With the ever-
increasing immigration to Israel, society is continually affected by Orthodox political 
power, especially as executed in the Ministry of Religious Services. 
 
Attempted Change: Weak Laws and Conversion  
One of the most controversial components of Israeli religious tensions is the 
distribution of funds by the Ministry. Since the Ministry of Religious Services’ founding, 
Haredi “cultural activities” were significantly over funded. Institutions that gained this 
additional funding included Haredi educational and social services, Yeshivas,158 youth 
movements, and other religious institutions.  Initially, government budgets contained 
requirements to include a list of sums allocated to religious institutions by name, but no 
laws designated amounts or ratios of funds between religious sects. 159 Non-Orthodox 
groups claim that Haredi and other ultra-Orthodox and Orthodox activities are 																																																								
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overfunded, effectively lessening their representation within the Ministry. In 1985, a 
Budget Foundations Law came to vote as an amendment to the national budget. In the 
law, each category of public institutions would receive equal distributions of financial 
support. In theory, the Ministry of Religious Services was required to appropriate an 
“inclusive sum of support for every category of public institutions, which would be 
equally distributed to all institutions included in that same category.” 160 Surprisingly the 
law was passed, but it failed in implementation, exemplifying Thelen’s model type of 
change conversion. A loophole in the law meant that the Ministry of Religious Services 
could differentiate between public and private institutions, and could continue grating 
greater allowances to Orthodox Yeshivas. 161 This was possible because in the law, the 
equal allowance requirement applied to institutions in the same category, and equal 
distribution was only required within categories. A simple recategorization nullified the 
entire law. Additionally, the Independent Education System of the Ashkenazi and the 
Sephardi Center of Fountain of Religious Education in Israel gained exceptions. Both of 
these institutions were Haredi education networks and were (unsurprisingly) given 
greater funding. 162  
The passage of the Budget Foundations Law highlights the non-Orthodox publics 
frustration with the apparent favoritism within the Ministry of Religious Services. Secular 
groups and minority religious groups alike complain of inadequate state funding and 																																																								
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through communicative discourse pushed their political parties to alter the status quo. 
While these epistemic communities were able to garner enough support for an 
institutional change to be made, the institution itself was resilient enough to continue its 
usual practices. This is a case of conversion, where a law was passed but is significantly 
altered during stages of implementation. The Orthodox establishment within the Ministry 
of Religious Services was simply too powerful. Like in Turkey, the Ministry that initially 
worked to incapacitate conservative forces instead marginalized other aspects of society. 
 
Successful Change: Layering for Isolation163  
 Cleavages in Israeli society occur between religious sects, ethnic divides, 
economic divisions and more. The divide between ultra-Orthodox, Orthodox and secular 
Jews has roots in the Yishuv period. Tensions between the Sephardim and Ashkenazim 
increased in later decades as Jews from the Middle East immigrated to Israel after 
escalating conflicts between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Domestic Israeli conflict is 
particularly unique as groups form along both ethnic and religious lines. For example, the 
Shas party (the Sephardic Torah Guardians) represents Sephardi ultra-Orthodox Jews. 
They are a Haredi party that seeks to fight perceived discrimination from Ashkenazi 
(both secular and religious) Jews. Formed in 1984, the Shas party has been in each 																																																								
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government since, and increasingly gained power in the late 1990s.164 While the National 
Religious Party (a religious Zionist party) held the post of Minister of Religious Services 
for much of the ministry’s history, Orthodox forces influenced the allocation of funds, 
public support for traditional education and more. With the rise of the Shas party, they 
gained leadership of the Ministry of Religious Services more consistently (ensuring their 
influence in the boarder Israeli government). Secular and center parties began to express 
their concern at augmented influence, and in 2003 Shenoy (“Change”, a liberal secular 
party) politicians campaigned against Orthodox extremist parties. Communicative 
discourse of elites easily mobilized thousands of Israelis, who collectively advocated for 
the decrease of power for Orthodox coalitions.  
In a deal to form a new coalition government, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon agreed 
to close the Ministry of Religious Services.165 The Prime Minister himself served as 
Minister of Religious Affairs for 11 months in 2003.166 In January 2004, the Ministry was 
abolished. 167 While “abolished” the Ministry continued functioning, however, and was 
incorporated to other broader institutions.  Institutional replacement was in full effect. 
Just a few years later, Shas and other religious parties gained influence in the Knesset. In 
2006, Yitzhak Cohen (of the Shas party) gained the post of Minister without Portfolio, in 																																																								
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charge of religious councils (leading to a de facto reestablishment of the Ministry). 168 In 
2008, the Ministry was reinstated as the Ministry of Religious Services, and continued to 
function as it always has, under Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox control.  
The changing legal definitions of the Ministry of Religious Services seems to be a 
force of Israeli political parties, or as a result of the electoral system that allows 
significant influence of small political parties, but that explanation does not fully explain 
the incremental evolution of the Israeli political atmosphere. Yusuf explains the triumph 
of the Shas party as a result of mobilization of peripheral factions of Israeli society. 
Yusuf argues that through framing in national discourse, religious parties were able to 
garner political support by “resonating” with socio-cultural grievances communicated 
through social networks and “articulated by credible agents.”169 He continues, “Shas...not 
only emerged as political actors, but have also developed into social movements 
mobilizing masses with elaborate social networks.”170 After they were excluded from the 
Sharon government in 2003, they toned down their rhetoric while increasing internal 
pressures to regain control of Ministries and policy decisions. External pressure escalated 
as advocacy coalitions increased calls for inclusion in the government. An incremental 
change was seen in the appointment of Minister Cohen to Minster without Portfolio, and 
culminated in a reestablishment of the Ministry.  
Attaining information on the Ministry of Religious Services is notoriously 																																																								
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difficult, as is the lack of transparency around the Ministry’s policies and practices. The 
Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox favoritism is found in budgetary details (like the successful 
allocation of funds to religious educational centers) but overall the Ministry is complex 
and rarely understood. The jostle of advocacy coalitions present in Israel is clear in the 
closure and reopening of the Ministry of Religious Services. To take away a ministerial 
position, Sharon clearly felt he had the public and elite support of secular actors. The 
continuation of Ministry of Religious Services’ functions, however, show that the 
institution had effectively entrenched itself in Israeli society and governance. The entire 
progression is a display of replacement and conversion (when the ministry conducted its 
affairs under other ministries), layering (when Cohen was awarded the Minister without 
Portfolio position), and more layering when it was reestablished. The disorganized back 
and forth of the Ministry of Religious Services hints to the underlying debate of the place 
of religion in government. Sixty-five years after it’s founding, Israel continues to face 
internal divisions regarding its national identity. 
 
Impacts of Change 
 In each of these cases, the power of the Orthodox institution and its advocacy 
coalitions within Israel is highlighted. It is powerful within the government as a result of 
Israel’s unique electoral system, and whether the majority party is the Labor or Likud 
party, elites need the support of Orthodox groups. As a result of compromises struck with 
Orthodox Jews decades ago, the Israeli government remains swayed by their discourse 
and demands. The Israeli Ministry of Religious Services is an ideal example of how 
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rational actors cannot solely influence an entire system, and how sociological change is 
not powerful enough to alter an institution. Discourse within and surrounding the 
institution must demand change, and the coalitions at the foundation of the power sharing 
agreements within an institution must be under significant pressure to realign. Without 
this combination of forces, institutions will withstand pressure or deflect change.  
 
Lessons of Institutional Change 
 Instrumental in establishing the relationship between church and state, the 
Ministries of Religion in Turkey and Israel were established as minor ministries without a 
dictated internal structure. Both faced intense pressure from conservative groups to 
expand, isolate, and continue favoring specific interpretations of Islam and Judaism. 
Political dominance in the early Turkish republic meant minority groups functioned at the 
periphery of influence, while in Israel conservative groups immediately forged an 
alliance with centrists to warrant a place of authority from within the government. 
Minority groups attempted to instigate change but could not garner adequate support for 
their alterations. Secular groups in Turkey successfully were able to change the 
Presidency of Religious Affairs through layering that isolated the Ministry from external 
forces. Conservative groups in Israel were not able to initially defend their precious 
Ministry but were able to retaliate and reestablish the Ministry only a few years after its 
demise. Thelen’s modes of institutional change explain these successes and failures. 
Political realignment can lead to real change.171 																																																								
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  While these case studies are beneficial in employing the lens of historical and 
discursive institutionalism, they also highlight the challenges democratic governments 
face when attempting to incorporate religion into institutions. Both Turkey and Israel 
aimed to establish modern secular states that would represent liberal and republican 
values. Each had to bow to religious pressures, however, and in doing so turned to 
laicism that then was never completely implemented. This failure and the subsequent 
enshrinement of a particular interpretation of religion failed to properly represent the 
entirety of Turkish and Israeli populations. Marginalization led to socio-cultural 
cleavages, populations that could be mobilized and sentient actors that had the influence 
and position to introduce, mold and execute new aspects of discourse. 172 By tracing the 
evolutions of these institutions, it is clear that institutions shape the interactions of actors 
that give context to ideas, force to discourse and power to collective action. Although 
they began under different institutional constructions, Turkish and Israel’s ideological 
philosophies led to similar evolutions within their Religious Ministries, and have led to 
similar alienation of minorities and a failure to include “all” Turks and Israelis.  
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Conclusions 
 Turkey and Israel are incredibly influential players in the modern international 
system, and their internal political disputes play out on the international stage. Domestic 
political debates are clearly reflected in their Ministries of Religion. Turkey’s Islamist 
parties have been garnering intense focus in recent years, as have the Israeli ultra-
Orthodox. These conservative groups are significant for every facet of government, but 
the Religious Ministries are particularly good for highlighting the discursive struggles 
amidst individual actors, advocacy coalitions, and the community as a whole. These 
disagreements extend to the general public who continue to struggle with national 
definitions of citizenship. Even though both countries attempted to emulate laicism and 
the French model, the Ministries of Religion became divisive institutions that alienated 
minorities and enabled narrow definitions of “Who is a Turk?” and “Who is a Jew?” 
Each ministry set up an inherently flawed, factious system based on a quick policy 
solution that enshrined conservative beliefs. Subsequent alterations to the Ministries 
further reinforced conservative forces and highlighted the importance of gaining 
discursive unity at the philosophical level of generality before campaigning for 
institutional change.173 
 Turkey and Israel became nation states during two of the most volatile periods in 
international history. Rarely was a discursive struggle over definitions of citizenship and 
nation so extensive, and were so many actors able to contribute to national discourse on 																																																								
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matters of the state and governance. From citizenship to nationalist rhetoric, a myriad of 
advocacy coalitions sought to establish government structures in their own image. The 
omnipresence of religion was felt by all, and a key component of defining the new states. 
In Turkey, Ottomanism, Pan-Turkism, Islamism, and Kemalism battled for influence in 
discursive communities and struggled via coordinative and communicative discourse. 
Kemal struck a deal with the Islamist advocacy coalition and incorporated religion via the 
Presidency of Religious Affairs and inadvertently allowed them to determine the future of 
Turkish citizenship and nationalism. A similar situation occurred in Israel, where Zionist 
leader Ben-Gurion compromised with Orthodox advocacy coalitions. Their control of the 
Ministry of Religious Services dictated definitions of “Jewishness”. In both countries, 
advocacy coalitions of seculars and conservatives battled over normative definitions of 
citizenship as pre-existing communities fought for autonomy. Amidst these debates, two 
‘secular’ nation states were born, and religion was incorporated into government. Each 
centrist decided to “Keep his friends close, and his enemies closer”, and lose a battle in 
hopes of winning the war for a modern state. Most importantly, the creation of these 
ministries cemented the adoption of ethno-national grounds for citizenship, rather than 
only republican values. These institutions went on to define interactions between 
religious groups and the government, as well as inter-religious relations. As time went on, 
countless groups advocated change within the Ministries, yet most failed.   
Even though both Turkey and Israel sought to institute laicism, they failed when 
conservative groups were allowed control of the Religious Ministries and when initial 
codification neglected to determine the internal structure of the institutions. Conservative 
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groups were able to entrench their ideals and interpretations of Islam and Judaism. Later 
attempts to alter the ministries realized the institutional constraints keeping them from 
effective change. In Turkey, the Alevi minority could not translate their public discourse 
into a true advocacy coalition without the support of elites. In Israel, non-Orthodox 
epistemic communities were able to garner some public support, but were no match for 
the thoroughly entrenched Orthodox ideals. In both cases, initial ideational values were 
codified into institutions that then resisted change. The only time these institutions 
evolved were in efforts to isolate themselves from further change. Turkey’s Presidency of 
Religious Affairs effectively changed the legal routes of changing the institution and 
removed itself from influence of the parliamentary government. Israel’s Ministry of 
Religious Affairs was once again traded in a political deal, but quickly resurfaced 
stronger than ever. Through both cases we see the resilience of ideas and the institutions 
they produce. 
While these case studies are beneficial in employing the lens of historical and 
discursive institutionalism, they also highlight the challenges democratic governments 
face when attempting to incorporate religion into institutions. Both Turkey and Israel 
aimed to establish modern secular states that would represent liberal and republican 
values. Each had to bow to religious pressures, however, and in doing so turned to 
laicism that then was never completely implemented. This failure and the subsequent 
enshrinement of a particular interpretation of religion failed to properly represent the 
entirety of Turkish and Israeli populations. Marginalization led to socio-cultural 
cleavages, populations that could be mobilized and actors that had the influence and 
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position to introduce, mold and execute new aspects of discourse. 174 By tracing the 
evolutions of these institutions, it is clear that institutions shape the interactions of actors 
that give context to ideas, force to discourse and power to collective action. Although 
they began under different institutional constructions, Turkish and Israel’s ideological 
philosophies led to similar evolutions within their Religious Ministries, and have led to 
similar alienation of minorities and a failure to include “all” Turks and Israelis 
While the instances highlighted in this thesis are historically removed from 
today’s news, they are incredibly relevant to contemporary discussions. The relationship 
between religion and state dominates Turkish and Israeli politics, and permeates into 
every facet of government. Although initial leaders desired laicism, their political 
dealings led to an entrenchment of religious ideals and doomed the experiment of laïcité 
from the start. Additionally, countless countries pursue paradigms of laicism, and 
academic literature would do well to consider alternative interpretations of separation of 
church and state. Last, comparing Turkey and Israel reminds readers that debates 
regarding of religious influence on government are not particular to one religion or 
another and affect every nation. 175 It is incredibly valuable to consider the origins of 
contemporary institutions, and how they arrived at current iterations, because such 
changes shed light on the political compromises struck, the forces at work, and the 
amount of support needed to truly change such an integral part of society.  
																																																								
174 Yusuf, Mobilizing Religion in Middle East Politics, 19. 
175 Tepe, “Moderation of Religious Parties: Electoral Constraints, Ideological 
Commitments, and Capacities of Religious Parties in Israel and Turkey”, 470.  
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